Trump assesses in what order to attack other countries

Trump started his second presidency with apparently contradictory foreign policy signals. His administration was being filled with anti-China, anti-Palestinian, anti-Cuba, anti-Venezuela and anti-Iran hawks: Secretary of State Rubio, National Security Adviser Waltz, Defence Secretary Hegseth. However, before his inauguration, Trump called Xi Jinping, reporting: “It is my expectation that we will solve many problems together …. President Xi and I will do everything possible to make the World more peaceful and safe.” Simultaneously, Trump’s new CIA director Ratcliffe whipped up hysteria against China around the origin of the Covid virus.

Trump endorsed the Gaza ceasefire even as he proposed ethnically cleansing Gaza’s 1.5 million Palestinians by moving them to Jordan and Egypt; started resupplying 2,000 pound bombs to Israel; and appointed as UN Ambassador Elise Stefanik, – who claims Israel has ‘biblical right’ to the West Bank.

Contrary to speculation that Trump would cut off support to Ukraine, Trump, instead, threatened to ramp up sanctions against Russia.

Cuba was falsely reinstated on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the Panama Canal was threatened with seizure.

Trump lifted the immediate ban on TikTok, while clarifying that he wanted its sale.

Policies were not even clear from one announcement to another. His initial executive orders contained no tariffs, but within 24 hours, he threatened Mexico, Canada and China with them.

Despite appearing inconsistent, closer examination reveals that Trump has decided the U.S. has too many “enemies” to attack simultaneously. Better is to pick them off one at a time, hoping that one country will not respond to a U.S. attack on another.

The reason for these apparent inconsistencies becomes clear if we look past Trump’s rhetoric and consider the real situation he is confronting.

Contrary to US propaganda that the US economy is in great shape, China, with its 2024 GDP growth at 5.0 %, continues to outgrow the U.S., exposing as farcical claims such as the Wall Street Journal’s that China had a “a stagnant economy”. In contrast, the IMF projects the U.S.’s 2024 growth to be 2.8%. China is growing 80% faster than the U.S.

Even more strategically serious, the U.S. is now almost entirely dependent on capital from abroad for net investment (the increase in investment taking into account depreciation). In the last quarter of 2024, net U.S. capital creation was a paltry 0.4% of Gross National Income. In contrast, its net fixed investment financed from abroad was over 4.0% of GDP.

Trump can only increase the U.S. growth rate by increasing U.S. investment through financing from one of two sources.

Domestically, as Trump rejects reducing military spending or rationalising the grotesquely inefficient U.S. health system, investment can only be increased by a shift of income from working class consumption to companies. To achieve that Trump has to attack working class wages, or social security, or both. This is the path advocated by Musk with his calls for $2 trillion cut in U.S. government expenditure. This path started on Trump’s first day with executive orders limiting health care for 20 million lower paid workers, and an instruction “to reduce the size of the Federal Government’s workforce”.

Racism will be used to divide opposition to such attacks. Trump immediately abolished all federal diversity, equity and inclusion (dei) programmes – overturning policies in place since the Civil Rights movement. This was paralleled by moves against dei by companies such as Walmart, Harley-Davidson, John Deere, and McDonald’s. But this domestic attack risks undermining support for his presidency.

The alternative source of finance for U.S. investment would increase U.S. extraction of capital from abroad. Given the problems confronting the U.S. economy strategically all possible resources must be tapped – requiring an attack on numerous countries. But many Trump strategists (who’ve concluded that confronting China and Russia at the same time was a mistake) agree that defeating all “enemies” simultaneously is impossible. Thus, enemies, at least the stronger ones, should be attacked one at a time. Consequently, Trump must decide in which order countries should be attacked, and neutralise some while others are confronted. The choices confronting Trump is therefore which forms of U.S. aggression should be stepped up or maintained and which may be temporarily calmed down.

The biggest proposal is to halt confrontation with Russia in Ukraine. But this would require halting attempts to expand NATO and ending the Ukraine war. But as the Economist noted: “in Ukraine… he has pledged to stop the fighting. Because he has more leverage over America’s allies than Vladimir Putin, the easier route is to walk away by ending support and so force concessions on the government in Kyiv… But that would undermine his other goals. Abandonment would court comparisons to Mr Biden and his hapless departure from Afghanistan… He may yet decide that being seen as ready to back Ukraine will strengthen his hand.”

While the entire Trump administration considers China their main enemy, it is also the most powerful one. Trump may therefore judge that a central confrontation with China should be delayed until after other “enemies” have been defeated. Trump’s initially conciliatory rhetoric towards Xi Jinping might signal an attempt at a temporary deal not to greatly ramp up confrontation with China in return for China not seriously opposing the U.S. attacks on Venezuela, Cuba or Iran.

A complication for Trump is that the well-publicised video call between Xi Jinping and Putin hours after Trump’s inauguration made clear that Russia and China cannot be so easily divided.

So, then which less powerful opponents might the Trump administration consider attacking?

West Asia is one immediate target, as the U.S. considers that, with Israel, it has won major victories, achieving unchallengeable military superiority by weakening Hamas, Hezbollah and the overthrow of Assad in Syria. Obvious targets would be further attacks in Lebanon, Gaza and preparation for an attack on Iran.

In Latin America, the U.S. also considers its outright military supremacy. Here the most aggressive course are being advocated, with a New York Times article calling for invading Venezuela, the reinstating of Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the imposition of tariffs against Colombia, Trump simply stating he will take back the Panama canal.

International organisations can also easily be attacked – the U.S. is withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the World Health Organisation.

In summary, the seemingly contradictory signals coming from the Trump administration merely reflect an ongoing debate within it over the order in which these other countries should be attacked – and an attempt to allow the Trump administration to deal with its intended targets one at a time. Ultimately, Trump will not only attack the American people but a whole series of other countries.

By John Ross